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ABSTRACT
Demand for Customized Products, Production Flexibility, and Price Competition
by William Novshek and Lynda Thoman*
We examine markets where, in addition to production of standard (core) products, mass
customization is technologically feasible.  We compare a setting where a monopolist
provides both standard and custom goods to a setting where an entrant joins the custom
market, and find customers' tastes affect the social desirability of entry.  The entrant is
unconcerned about the impact of his custom production on the incumbent's core product
market and in some cases may supply more custom products than is socially desirable.
In contrast to previous literature, we show that increased variability of demand may lead
to a reduction in investment in flexible production technologies.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Nachfrage nach Spezialprodukten, Fertigungsflexibilität und Preiswettbewerb
In diesem Beitrag werden Märkte untersucht, auf denen zusätzlich zur Produktion von
Standardprodukten die Herstellung von Spezialprodukten in großen Stückzahlen („mass
customization“) technologisch möglich ist. Es wird eine Situation verglichen, in der ein
Monopolist sowohl Standard- als auch Spezialprodukte anbietet mit einer Situation, in
der der eintretende Konkurrent den Markt für Spezialprodukte bedient. Der Vergleich
zeigt, daß der Kundengeschmack die soziale Wünschbarkeit des Eintritts beeinflußt. Für
den Eintretenden ist es unerheblich wie sich seine Spezialprodukte auf den
Hauptproduktmarkt des eingesessenen Unternehmens auswirken und in manchen Fällen
kann es dazu kommen, daß er mehr Spezialprodukte anbietet als gesellschaftlich
wünschbar. Im Gegensatz zur bisherigen Literatur wird gezeigt, daß zunehmende
Variabilität der Nachfrage zu einer Verringerung von Investitionen in flexible
Fertigungstechnologien führen kann.
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1. Introduction
Firms realize they can often add value for their customers by tailoring or
customizing their products to meet the special needs of individual buyers.  For many
products the standard (or uncustomized) market is becoming more competitive,
squeezing profit margins.  This creates additional incentives to find methods to generate
added value for customers, part of which can be extracted as profit for the firm.  At the
same time, in many industries, the additional cost necessary to customize a product has
decreased, making product customization a viable alternative.1  Improved technologies
such as programmable robots, the advanced training of workers to make them more
adaptable and responsive, and the redesigned of the production process to reflect
innovations such as just-in-time inventory management have all contributed to making
customization possible at reasonable costs.
When Siemens found profit margins shrinking in its standard electric motor
market, it responded by emphasizing custom motors for individual purchasers.  The
custom motors quickly became a substantial fraction of overall sales.  The market for
personal computers, where standard setups are essentially a homogeneous commodity,
has become extremely competitive, with little room for profit.  Producers such as Dell
now custom build their machines to order, with literally thousands of combinations of
features possible.  Deere & Co., faced with continued declines in industry demand, has
introduced a new strategy whereby it customizes farm equipment to meet its customers'
requirements.  Mass customization has made inroads into the clothing industry; Levi
Strauss & Co will make a pair of Levi's to any individual's specific measurements.
The ability to customize a product is an aspect of production flexibility.  Many
meanings for the term production flexibility have been discussed in the literature.  Often
the desire for flexibility arises out of a need to respond to uncertainty about the quantity
that will be demanded in a single commodity context, or about the mix of quantities that
will be demanded in a multiproduct context.  In this literature, if the set of produced
products is not fixed, the set of alternatives is very limited (for example, to producing
one or both of two potential products).
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 This is in contrast to an earlier period such as that discussed by Fleischer (1997) for the machine
tool industry in Germany, in which producers of specialized products suffered serious market
erosion due to drastically reduced prices for standard products made possible by major cost
reductions for production of standard products.  Those same cost reducing techniques are now being
applied to customization.
2In contrast, the notion of production flexibility we have been discussing is
motivated by the dispersion in taste among potential purchasers.  It cannot be modeled
adequately with a small number of alternatives.  At the same time, uncertainty about
demand is unnecessary.  Instead, our notion of flexible production allows the firm to
create value for its customers by tailoring the products to fit different individuals’ needs
or desires, and then to capture some of that added value through appropriate pricing.
We model this notion of flexibility and examine its consequences.  Our model is
simple, to retain tractability, but captures key features of this idea.  There is a market for
a single core product, but within that market, value is added by customizing a product
for an individual consumer.  The problem is that there is a dispersion of desired
customizations, and only a consumer’s particular desired customization adds value for
her.  A “wrong” customization does not destroy value for her, but is merely a useless
(for her) but harmless change.
We start from a point at which a single firm, called the incumbent, produces a
single variant of the core product.2  Our game begins when customization becomes
feasible.  We consider both the monopoly problem (incumbent alone) and a duopoly
problem (incumbent plus entrant).  There are three strategic stages.  First, firms invest in
flexibility, to lower the cost of being able to produce a larger range of customized
products.  Next, firms choose the range of customized products they will produce.
Finally, firms set prices for each of their products, including the incumbent’s original
product, which we call the standard product.
We explicitly model the consumer sector used to generate demands, and we use
cost functions to model the technological possibilities for firms.  To capture the idea
that, in the duopoly case, customization increases the competitive pressure for the
standard product, we assume per unit production costs for customized products are not
too much larger than per unit production costs for the incumbent’s standard product.
Since individuals view “wrongly” customized products as no worse than the
incumbent’s standard product, the entrant can compete with the incumbent for the
standard product market (individuals without an appropriate customized product or for
whom the customized product is relatively too expensive).  Our assumption means that,
in equilibrium, the per unit production cost of a customized product is a binding upper
bound on the price the incumbent charges for the standard product.  This is our version
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 As discussed in Section 2, with two such producers, this market would lead to losses for each firm.
3of the standard product market being more competitive after the introduction of
customization (and an entrant).
We first examine monopoly and duopoly models without uncertainty.  We
consider two distributions of consumers tastes, a “positive” case” and a “negative case.”
In the positive case, consumers with high valuations for the standard product also have
high value added (and thus valuations) for customization.  In this case, when the cost of
flexibility is low, in both the monopoly and duopoly outcomes the full range of custom
products is produced, but the duopoly outcome has higher total surplus.  When the cost
of flexibility is higher, but not too high, in the duopoly outcome the full range of custom
products is produced but the monopolist offers only a standard product.  Total surplus is
again higher with the duopoly.  The entrant has more incentive to offer custom products
than the incumbent/monopolist whose custom products compete with its own standard
product.
In the negative case, consumers with high valuations for the standard product
have low value added and relatively low valuations for customization.  In this case the
monopolist is willing to offer a full range of custom products even at flexibility costs
which are high enough to prevent the entrant from doing so.  At flexibility costs low
enough that the full range of custom products is offered in both the monopoly and
duopoly outcomes, total surplus is larger in the monopoly solution than with duopoly.
This is because the monopolist is able to adjust both standard and custom product prices
to sell to all consumers; those with high valuations for the standard (and relatively low
valuations for the custom) product buy the standard product while those with high
valuations for the custom (and low valuations for the standard) product buy the custom
product.  The entrant must battle with the incumbent’s standard product to sell more
custom products, and must lower price too much to attract as many buyers.  Here the
monopolist does a better job of selling custom products to those consumers who should
be getting them (because their value added exceeds the extra cost of producing the
custom product).
The differences between the positive and negative cases suggest that the nature
of the distribution of consumer tastes will play an important role in determining the
extent to which the market for customized products will be served by a single firm, and
whether additional entry should be encouraged.
We also examine a monopoly problem with random demand.  Here we show that
increased variability of demand may lead to reduced investment in flexibility (and
4reduced product range), contrary to the results for other types of production flexibility.
This highlights the difference between the alternative notions of flexibility.
Of the large variety of issues addressed in the literature under the general
heading of flexibility in production, we will mention the three most relevant to our
paper.3  The first topic concerns uncertainty driven desire for flexibility in the single
firm case.  Some input levels must be chosen before uncertainty (about the prices for
outputs and other inputs) is resolved while other inputs are chosen after some or all
uncertainty is resolved.  Turnovsky (1973) and Epstein (1978) address such problems
for a competitive firm.  Jones and Ostroy (1984) examine a more general version of this
type of question, and emphasize the relationship between the level of flexibility
embodied in the initial choices and the amount of information that will be received later.
Greater flexibility preserves more options for the future use of the information that will
arrive.  A conclusion of this strand of literature that is relevant to our paper is the
observation that increased variability of, for example, demand for the output good,
increases the level of flexibility chosen initially.  This conclusion does not hold in our
context, as we show in Section 4.
Strategic choice of flexibility is introduced in Dixon (1985,1986).  Firms choose
flexibility in the first stage of a model in which they act as competitive price takers in
the second stage.  In Dixon (1985), the strategic choice is the level of capital, where
increased capital lowers the marginal cost curve for the price-taking stage.
Underinvestment in capital reduces flexibility in the second stage, in the sense of Stigler
(1939), and increases profit.  Dixon (1986) extends the analysis to allow a commitment
to the levels of one or both of the two inputs to production, or to neither input, in the
first stage
The third strand of literature involves multiple product firms.  It is related to an
extensive literature in Operations Management concerning flexible manufacturing
systems.  There are two product markets, and firms must initially decide whether to use
dedicated machines, each of which produce just one of the products or to use a flexible
machine, which can produce either product.  He and Pindyck (1992) analyze a firm that
is a monopolist in both markets.  The firm initially decides which type of machines to
employ, then continually invests in the chosen technology.  Demands are random, with
negative correlations between markets.  Even though the flexible machine is more
expensive, it may be more profitable, and an increase in the variability of demand (with
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 Beckman (1990) discusses a wide range of types of flexibility in manufacturing.
5the negative correlation between markets) increases the relative advantage of flexible
over dedicated machines.
Roeller and Tombak (1990) analyze a game in which two firms engage in quantity
competition in the two markets in the second stage, thus introducing strategic
interaction to the second as well as first stage.  In the first stage, firms choose either a
flexible production technology, which allows a firm to compete in both product
markets, or a dedicated technology, which forces a firm to choose a single market in
which to compete.  They identify the conditions under which firms would choose the
flexible technology.
Our paper differs substantially from the existing literature because the desire for
flexibility is driven by the possibility to customize products for individual customers.
With a continuum of potential customizations, the question is not whether to use a
flexible machine, but rather, how flexible to make the machine, and what range of
customizations to offer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains the model and
some initial observations on the nature of the equilibria in the duopoly case.  Section 3
compares monopoly and duopoly outcomes when there is no uncertainty.  Section 4
shows that for a monopolist facing uncertainty about demand, increased variability may
lead to a decrease, rather than an increase in the desired level of flexibility.  Concluding
comments are contained in Section 6.
2. Model
This section introduces the model and makes some basic observations about the
nature of the duopoly equilibrium.  These observations simplify the discussion of the
duopoly model in Section 3.
The set of potential variants of the standard product is a continuum, represented
by the unit interval [0,1].  Each type t [0,1] represents a different customization of the
standard product.
Individual consumers are competitive price takers who will purchase either
nothing, or one unit of one of the available types of the product.  Each consumer is
characterized by a triple, (v0 ,v1,t), where v0 t 0 , v1 t v0 , and t [0,1].  The type, t , is
6the only customization of the product that the consumer views as having added value.
A consumer whose desired customization is type t  will also be called a type t
consumer.  Variants of the product with types other than t  are perfect substitutes for one
another, and the consumer’s reservation value for any type other than t  is v0 .  The
consumer’s reservation value for type t  is v1 .  Hence, for customer t , the value added
by the customization t  is v1  v0 t 0; no other customization creates additional value.  It
is important to keep in mind that there is no notion of types being similar in preference
terms.  Either the type is the desired one, or it is not.  Thus, though the structure may
look similar to many spatial or differentiated product models, it is in fact quite different.
The demand behavior for a consumer characterized by (v0 ,v1,t) is simple.  If
type t  is the only one available, and has price p1, then the consumer purchases one unit
of type t  when v1  p1 t 0.  If type t  is not available, all available types are perfect
substitutes, and the effective price for the consumer is the lowest price for any available
type.  If this lowest price is p0 , then the consumer purchases one unit of one of the
lowest priced types when v0  p0 t 0.  If type t  is available at price p1, and some other
types are available, with lowest price p0 , then the consumer compares v1  p1 , v0  p0 ,
and 0 to determine whether to purchase one unit of type t , one unit of one of the lowest
priced other types, or nothing.  This is illustrated in Figure 1.  Note that those who
purchase the customized type t  good have relatively high value added for that type, or
v1  v0 t p1  p0 .
Insert Figure 1 here
We will consider three different distributions of consumer characteristics,
(v0 ,v1,t), in each of which there is a continuum of consumers.  In each case, the
conditional distribution on (v0 ,v1)  given t  is independent of t  as long as type t  is
desired by some consumers.  This greatly simplifies our analysis since each “ t  market”
will have similar demand properties.
The first two distributions are for the nonrandom cases in Section 3. For each of
these the mass of consumers is one, and every potential type is desired by some
consumers. Given S ! 0 , the first distribution is uniform on
{(v0 ,v1,t) | 0d v0 d1,v1  (1 S)v0 ,0 d t d 1}.  Note v0  and v1  are perfectly positively
correlated, as are v0  and the value added, v1  v0 .  This will be referred to as the positive
7Figure 1.
Purchase decisions for a consumer of type t.
Purchase
Good t
No
Purchase
Purchase
Cheapest
Non- t
Type
v1  v0v1
p1
p0 v0
8case.  Given T !1, the second distribution is uniform on
{(v0 ,v1, t) | 0d v0 d1,v1  T  v0(T 1),0 d t d 1}.  Note v0  and v1  are perfectly
negatively correlated, as are v0  and the value added, v1  v0 .  This will be referred to as
the negative case.  These distributions are used to investigate how the correlations
matter for the effect of increased competition on the equilibrium range of customized
products.4
The third distribution is for the random case in Section 4.  The distribution is
uniform on {(v0 *,v1*,t) | 0d t d ˜ m }, where 0  v0*  v1 *, and ˜ m  is random taking
values m1  and m2  each with probability 1 2, where 1! m2 !m1 ! 0.  Not every
potential product type is desired by some consumers, and the set of product types that
are desired is random.  For simplicity, in this case the conditional distribution on (v0 ,v1)
given t d ˜ m  is degenerate, with all weight on (v0 *,v1*).
At this point it will be useful to return to Figure 1, assume type t  is available,
introduce each of the distributions in turn, and consider which of the (v0 ,v1)  would
purchase t , purchase another good, or purchase nothing, given the prices in the figure.
For the positive case, the possible (v0 ,v1)  combinations lie on a line with slope greater
than one, beginning at (0,0).  Those with low v0  and v1  purchase nothing; those with
intermediate v0  and v1  purchase the cheapest type instead of type t ; while those with
high v0  and v1  purchase type t .
5
  For the negative case, the possible (v0 ,v1)
combinations lie on a line with negative slope beginning at (0,T ).  Those with low v0
and high v1  purchase type t ; those with intermediate v0  and v1  purchase nothing, while
those with high v0  and low v1  purchase the cheapest type instead of type t .  For the
random case, only (v0 *,v1*) is possible, so all make the same purchase decision.
We now turn to the production technology.  There are two types of machines:
dedicated machines and flexible machines.  A dedicated machine can produce only a
single type of good.  The machine has a strictly positive fixed cost and unlimited
production capacity with constant per-unit production cost.  For notational convenience,
all values v0  and v1  are measured as net of the per-unit production cost, and that cost
can be treated as zero.  Since a dedicated machine has a strictly positive machine cost, it
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 We have also examined a distribution similar to the negative case, but with 0  T  1, in which v0
and v1  are perfectly positively correlated while v0  and the value added v1  v0 , are perfectly
negatively correlated.  Not unexpectedly, the results, not reported in this paper, form a transition
zone between the results for the positive and negative cases.
5
 Depending on the prices and parameters, not all three purchase decisions necessarily occur.  This
discussion indicates the “order” in which the decisions occur, if they do occur.  These comments
apply to negative case as well.
9is only profitable if it is used to sell to a positive mass of consumers.  None of the three
distributions we consider has any lump of mass at any type t , so the relevant demand
must come from sales as a standard, rather than customized, product (i.e., from sales to
consumers who desire a different type but purchase this instead as the cheapest of the
non-ideal types).  Hence no firm would ever purchase more than one dedicated
machine, and the actual type produced by the dedicated machine is irrelevant.  For
notational convenience we will not specify the type produced by any dedicated
machine, but will refer to it as the standard product.
The second type of machine available is a flexible machine, which is able to
produce more than one type.  There are three kinds of costs associated with a flexible
machine: machine cost, product line cost, and unit production cost.  The machine cost
for flexibility level K ! 0 is rK , where r ! 0.  The product line cost is determined by
the range of types of goods the machine will be used to produce; it does not depend on
total production or the production levels of any type produced.  For any range of types
the product line cost is lower the more flexible the machine.  Because of our
distributional assumptions, the number of different types that can be produced matters,
but the specific types do not.  The product line choice is y , the length of the range of
producible types.  Given flexibility K , the product line cost for a range of products of
length y  is y2 / K .  For any of the types in the range of types chosen, there is unlimited
production capacity with constant per-unit production cost, which is the same for all
types in the range, and is independent of the flexibility and product range choices.
Since the per unit production cost for a dedicated machine was normalized to zero, we
assume the per unit production cost for a flexible machine is c ! 0 .
The machine cost plus product line cost, rK  y2 / K , is such that there are
“constant returns to scale” in y  when K  and y  are coordinated.  That is, if K  is chosen
to minimize the machine cost plus product line cost for y , the optimal K  is
K * (y)  y / r , with machine plus product line cost ry r  y2 y / r  (2 r )y .
For a monopoly with no uncertainty, this observation will simplify the analysis, by
allowing us to combine the K  and y  choice stages.
We will consider both the problem for a single firm and for a duopoly.  Firms
are risk neutral, expected profit maximizers.  We start from a position in which one firm
already has a dedicated machine, and the machine costs are sunk.  As noted earlier, this
firm would never purchase a second dedicated machine.  Also since we will use price
setting by firms in the final strategic stage, if the second firm had a dedicated machine,
the resulting prices would equal the unit production cost, and the second firm could not
10
cover the dedicated machine cost.  Thus, the second firm would not purchase a
dedicated machine.  For these reasons, we simplify our game by removing the
possibility of the first firm purchasing a second dedicated machine and the possibility of
the second firm purchasing a dedicated machine.  Only the choice of a flexible machine
is considered.
Noting that stages 1 and 3 are relevant only for the random case in Section 4, our
time line is as follows:
1. [For the random case]  Nature picks a realization of the consumer distribution
parameter ˜ m .
2. Firms choose their investment levels in flexibility, Ki , simultaneously and
independently.
3. [For the random case] The realized value of ˜ m  is observed.
4. With the flexibility choices common knowledge, firms choose their product
ranges, yi , simultaneously and independently
5. With the product range choices common knowledge, firms choose prices for
each of the types they produce (including the type produced by the dedicated
machine), simultaneously and independently.
6. Consumers decide which types, if any, to purchase; firms produce to meet
demand for each type, and profits are realized.
Our solution concept is  pure strategy, subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium.
Let a  and b  denote the first and second firms, respectively.  Let p  denote the
first firm’s price for the type produced by its dedicated machine.  For i  a,b , for each
type t  in firm i ’s range of products, let pi (t)  denote firm i ’s price for type t .
For a consumer of type t, the effective prices for the type t good and the standard
good, p1(t) and p0 , respectively, are the lowest prices for the type t product and the
lowest prices for all other types combined.  If type t is produced by firm i alone, then
p1(t)  pi (t) .  If type t is produced by both firms, then p1(t) is the minimum of pa (t)
11
and pb (t).6  The price for the standard product is the lowest price overall,
p0  min{p,min{p1( ct ) | 0 d ct d1}}.7
When consumers are indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing, or
between purchasing different types, we need to impose tie-breaking rules.  We assume
consumers purchase rather than not purchase when indifferent between the two.  This
matters for the random case but not for the others.  When consumers are indifferent
between multiple products, with two exceptions, we assume they are split equally.  The
equal sharing assumption has no impact on the results.  The first exception to an equal
split is standard for multiproduct monopoly: if consumers are indifferent, then their
demand allocation is that which the monopolist prefers.  The second exception to an
equal split is the standard one for Bertrand competition with different unit costs: if
consumers are indifferent between products, one of which is offered at a price
exceeding its unit cost of production while the others are offered at prices equal to their
unit cost of production, then all demand goes to the product with price above unit cost.
This assumption will have an effect in all duopoly equilibria since we impose parameter
restrictions: c  S (2 4S)  for the positive case and c  T (1 2T)  for the negative
case.  By assuming that the unit costs of production for a flexible machine are not too
much larger than the unit costs of production for a dedicated machine, we guarantee that
in all duopoly equilibria, the price for the standard product produced by the dedicated
machine will equal the unit production cost for the flexible machine as discussed below.
In the remainder of this section we make some basic observations about the
nature of equilibrium in the duopoly problem.  These observations will allow us to carry
out the analysis in Section 3 in terms of just three prices: the incumbent’s
(monopolist’s) standard product price and a single custom price for each firm.
If yb  0 , then the pricing stage is just a monopoly optimization problem, so
consider an equilibrium in which yb ! 0 .  What must be true about any duopoly
equilibrium in which yb ! 0 ?
First note that in any duopoly equilibrium, the standard product of the incumbent
has positive sales.  This follows from its cost advantage, c ! 0 , and the fact that for each
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 We ignore the fact that the dedicated machine is used to produce one of the types, since that single
type has no effect on the aggregate demand faced by either firm.
7
 This should exclude p1(t)  itself, but the change has no effect on aggregate demand faced by either
firm.
12
type, there are some consumers of that type who have value added, v1  v0 , which is less
than the cost advantage.
If the standard product had positive sales at a price exceeding c, the entrant
could use just one of the types in its product range to undercut the standard product
price, for a discrete increase in profit serving the standard market with negligible impact
on the entrant’s customized product sales.  Thus the standard product price cannot
exceed c.  As mentioned earlier, we impose parameter restrictions such that, in duopoly
equilibrium, this is a binding constraint, so the incumbent will always end up selling its
standard product at price p  c .
If both firms produce type t, then in equilibrium, pa (t)  pb (t)  c .  This is
because the standard product is already priced at c, so pricing for type t cannot affect the
standard product market (recall the tie-breaking rule for allocation of demand leaves all
sales with the incumbent’s standard product) and it does not affect any other ct  market.
Thus type t has a classic homogenous good Bertrand market.
Given that overlapping custom markets lead to marginal cost pricing, firms
cannot cover the cost of product range expansion into these markets (and for the
incumbent, pricing type t at marginal cost can only hurt its standard product sales).
Thus, in equilibrium ya  yb d1, with no overlap of the types produced
The assumption that the distribution of (v0 ,v1)  among consumers is independent
of t, means that every t market in which a firm operates has the same demand function,
and there is a single standard product price, so the incumbent’s custom product price
will be the same for every t in its product range, and the entrant’s custom product price
will be the same for every t in its product range.8  Thus the remaining analysis can be
carried out in terms of three prices: the incumbent’s standard product price, p , the
incumbent’s custom product price, pa , and the entrant’s custom product price. pb .  This
last observation applies to the monopoly problem as well; the monopoly problem can be
carried out in terms of a standard price, p , and a custom price pa .
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 For one product in its product range, the entrant must set pb (t)  c  to maintain the equilibrium
standard  product price for the incumbent.  The single type is negligible in terms of the entrant’s
profit.
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3. Monopoly and Duopoly Flexibility Choice
In this section we examine and compare the monopoly and duopoly solutions for
both the positive and negative cases.  We start by considering a single type t of
consumer for whom one of the firms produces the custom product type t.  Let p1 be the
price for the type t good and let p0  be the lowest other price.  Figure 2 indicates the
relevant demand regions for the positive case.  If (p0 , p1)  is in Region A1, then both the
standard and type t good will have positive demand.  If (p0 , p1)  is above region A1,
demand is zero for type t but positive for the standard good.  In region B1, demand is
zero for the standard good and positive for type t.  Let d0  and d1  denote the demands by
type t consumers for the standard and type t products, respectively.  Then for the
positive case,
d0 (p0 , p1), d1( p0 , p1 )   
1  p0, 0 
p1  p0(S 1)
S
,
S  p1  p0
S
§
©
·
¹
0, S 1 p1
S 1
§
©
·
¹
­
®
°
°
¯
°
°
  above A1
in A1
in B1
Insert Figure 2 here
Figure 3 indicates the relevant demand regions for the negative case.  In both
regions A2 and B2 both the standard and type t products have positive demands.  In A2,
but not in B2, all consumers purchase something.  For the negative case, the demands
by type t consumers are:
d0 (p0 , p1), d1( p0 , p1 )  
p1  p0
T
,
T  p1  p0
T
§
©
·
¹
1 p0,
T  p1
T 1
§
©
·
¹
­
®
°
¯
°
    in A2
    in B2
Insert Figure 3 here
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Figure 2
Demand regions for type t in positive case.
1
p0
p1
S
S+ 1
Region
A1
Region
B1
p1  p0
p1  (S 1)p0
p1  S  p0
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Figure 3
Demand regions for type t in negative case.
1
p0
p1
T
Region
A2
Region
B2
p1  p0
p1  T  p0(T  1)
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Aggregate demands are obtained by combining the t market demands just
discussed with the demand by consumer types for which no custom product is available.
For each of these types, d0 ( p0 )  1 p0 .  Integrating over all the types, we obtain the
aggregate demand for the standard product, D0 , the aggregate demand for the
incumbent’s custom products, Da , and the aggregate demand for the entrant’s custom
products, Db .  For ya  yb d1, the aggregate demands, in terms of the incumbent’s
prices, p  and pa , and the entrant’s price, pb , are:
D0( p, pa, pb )  (1 ya  yb )(1 p)  yad0( p, pa )  ybd0 (p, pb )  ,
Da( p, pa )  yad1 (p, pa )  and
Db( p, pb)  ybd1( p, pb)   .
The corresponding profits, given ya , yb , Ka , and Kb , are9
S
a( p, pa , pb )  pD0 (p, pa , pb )  (pa  c)Da ( p, pa )  ya2 Ka  rKa   and
Sb ( p, pb )  ( pb  c)Db (p, pb )  yb2 Kb  rKb   .
First consider the monopoly problem (Kb { yb { 0), starting with the choice of
prices p  and pa  given ya  and Ka .  In the positive case, given our parameter restriction
c  S (2 4S) , the optimal (p, pa ) always lies in the interior of region A1.  The optimal
prices are:
pm , pa
m  12 ,
1 c  S
2
§
©
·
¹  .
In the negative case, given our parameter restriction c  T (1 2T) , the optimal (p, pa )
always lies on the boundary between the A2 and B2 regions:
pm , pa
m  1 y(T  c)2[1 y(T 1)],
1 T  y(T 1)(c  T )
2[1 y(T 1)]
§
©
¨ ·
¹
  .
                                               
9
 Here and throughout the rest of the paper, we ignore the sunk cost of the dedicated machine when
listing the profit for the incumbent/monopolist or the surplus.
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As noted earlier, for the monopoly problem without uncertainty, the ya  and Ka
choice stages can be combined into a single choice of ya  at cost (2 r )y , where the
corresponding Ka  is y r .  Substituting this and the optimal p m  and pa
m
 as functions
of ya  into the profit function, S a
m
, we observe that profit is linear in ya .  Comparing
profit when ya  0  to profit when ya  1, we obtain the overall monopoly solution.  For
the positive and negative cases, the values for Ka
m
, ya
m
, p m , pa
m
 (where relevant), S
a
m
and total surplus (producer’s plus consumers’ surplus) are listed in Table 1.  The term
rm
max
 is used to denote the largest value of r for which the monopolist is willing to invest
in flexibility.
Insert Table 1 here
We now turn to the duopoly problem starting with the price setting stage given
ya , yb , Ka , and Kb .  If yb  0 , this coincides with the monopoly case, so assume
yb ! 0 .  Recall we have made parameter restrictions (c  S (2 4S)  in the positive case,
c  T (1 2T)  in the negative case) that guarantee the incumbent’s equilibrium price for
the standard product is p  c .  Thus the duopoly pricing game can be carried out
entirely in terms of pa  and pb , given p  c .
In the positive case, there are now two versions of Figure 2, one for p  c  and
pa  and the other for p  c  and pb .  Each firm has a dominant “strategy” for its custom
price, since the custom markets do not interact directly, and the pair of dominant
“strategies” forms the pricing equilibrium: p  c , pa  (3c  S) 2 , and pb  (2c  S) / 2 .
The negative case is similar, with dominant “strategies” and pricing equilibrium: p  c ,
p
a  (3c  T ) 2, and pb  (2c  T) / 2 .
It is no longer possible to combine the K  and y  choice stages into a single step
since the choice of K  may have strategic implications in the y  choice stage.  First
consider the y  choice stage, given the K  choices.  There may be multiple equilibria,
since the firms do not want to have overlapping product ranges.  Again there is no direct
interaction between ya  and yb , unless ya  yb t1.  To find all the equilibria at this stage,
we first determine the maximum product range each firm would desire, as a function of
its investment in flexibility, K.  As long as the other firm’s product range is small
enough that, when added to the maximum range, the total is no more than 1, then the
firm’s best response is its maximum range.  Otherwise, the best response makes the sum
of product ranges equal to 1.
18
Table 1.  Monopoly Equilibrium
Case
Parameter
restriction
K
a
m y
a
m p m p
a
m
S
a
m Total
Surplus
Positive
r ! rm
max
 
(S  c)4
64S2
0 0
1
2 -
1
4
3
8
r  rm
max
 
(S  c)4
64S2
1
r 1
1
2
1 c  S
2
1
4

(S  c)2
4S
2 r
3 (S  c)2  S 
8S
2 r
Negative
r ! rm
max
 
(T  c)2 1 T  2c 2
64T 2
0 0
1
2
-
1
4
3
8
r  rm
max
 
(T  c)2 1 T  2c 2
64T 2
1
r 1
T 1 c
2T
T 2  1 c(T 1)
2T
1
4

(T  c)2 1 T  2c
4T
2 r
3(T  c)2  6T  2c 1
8T
2 r
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For the positive case, the maximum product ranges are:
ya (Ka )  
Ka(S  c)2
8S
  if  Ka 
8S
(S c)2
1                   if  Ka t
8S
(S  c)2
­
®
°
¯
°
     and
yb (Kb )  
KbS
8
  if  Kb 
8
S
1         if  Kb t
8
S
­
®
°
¯°
  
   .
If ya (Ka )  yb (Kb) d1, then these maximum ranges form the unique equilibrium.
If the sum exceeds 1, then any pair (ya ,yb )  such that ya  yb  1 and yi d yi(Ki )  for
i  a,b , forms an equilibrium.  The results for the negative case are similar, with
maximum product ranges
y
a
(K
a
)  
K
a
2c  c2 4  1
T
§
©
·
¹
 Tª
¬«
º
¼»
8
  if  K
a 
8
2c  c2 4 
1
T
§
©
·
¹ T
1                                          if  K
a
t
8
2c  c2 4
1
T
§
©
·
¹ T
­
®
°
°
¯
°
°
  
   and
yb (Kb )  
KbT
8
  if  Kb 
8
T
1         if  Kb t
8
T
­
®
°
¯°
  
   .
For both the positive and the negative cases, note that ya (K) d yb (K), with strict
inequality if 0  ya (K)  1.  This should not be surprising since by increasing its
product range, firm a increases its range of competition with its own standard
commodity.
20
Turning now to the K choice stage, it is clear the outcome depends on the
equilibrium anticipated for the y  choice stage.  Multiple equilibria are possible at this
stage as well.  The easiest way to find all equilibria at this stage is to start with the firm
anticipating that the next stage equilibrium will be the one in which its product range
will be yi (Ki)  if it chooses Ki , i  a,b .  Substituting this anticipated product range
equilibrium and the resulting pricing stage equilibrium into the firm’s profit function,
we obtain profit as a function of Ki .  When differentiating this with respect to Ki , by
the Envelope Theorem, since yi (Ki)  is optimal given Ki , the indirect effect of Ki
through yi  is zero, and only the direct cost reducing effect, yi(Ki) Ki 
2
 r , remains.
Note from the previous formulas, in each case, yi (Ki ) Ki , i  a,b , is constant as long as
yi (Ki) 1.  For Ki  such that yi (Ki)  1, the profit derivative is 1 Ki 
2
 r , which is
decreasing in Ki .
For each firm i , let hi  denote the fixed ratio yi (Ki ) Ki  when yi (Ki) 1.  Then
the optimal Ki  is easy to describe.  If r  (hi)2 , then profit is increasing in Ki  until
yi (Ki)  1, and beyond, until 1 Ki 
2
 r .  In this case the firm invests enough to pick
product range 1, and invests enough, Ki  1/ r , to make product range 1 as
inexpensive as possible.  If r ! (hi)2 , then the firm would invest nothing.  At r  (hi )2 ,
the firm is indifferent among any investment level between zero and 1 r .
Multiple equilibria arise for r  such that r d (hi)2 , i  a,b .  Both firms would
like to be the sole producer of all custom types.  For such r , any positive Ka  and Kb
such that Ka  Kb  1 r  can be sustained as an equilibrium in which ya  yb  1 and
each firm is productively efficient in the sense that its Ki  is the investment level that
minimizes the cost of product range yi  (i.e., Ki  yi r ).10
Let ri
max
, i  a,b,  be the largest r for which firm i is willing to invest.  For the
positive and negative cases these are listed in Table 2.  Note that in each case,
rb
max ! ra
max
, so for r between the two values there is a unique equilibrium.  For these r
values, for the positive and negative cases, the unique equilibrium values for Ki , yi , pi ,
Si , i  a,b , and for p  and for total surplus are listed in Table 2.
                                               
10
 If the anticipated product range equilibrium selection is “perverse,” equilibria in which the firms are
not productively efficient can also be sustained.
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Table 2.  Unique duopoly equilibrium when rb
max ! r ! ra
max
Firm ri
max Ki yi p pi Si
Total
Surplus
Positive
Case:
Firm a
(S  c)4
64S2 0 0 -
c
1
2
 c
§
©
·
¹
Firm b
S2
64
1
r 1
c
2c  S
2
S
4
 2 r
3S  4  4c  4c2
8
 2 r
Negative
Case:
Firm a
(T  c)2  4c2T 2
64T 2 0 0
-
c
2
Firm b
T 2
64 1
r 1
c
2c  T
2
T
4
 2 r
3T  4c  4
8
 2 r
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For r  ra
max
, the equilibrium is not unique, but the values listed in Table 2
describe the equilibrium that is most profitable for the entrant.  At the other extreme is
the equilibrium in which Kb  0  and Ka  1 r .  Since Kb  0  this reverts to the
monopoly problem for subsequent stages.  (Note the monopolist is willing to invest
K  1 r  whenever the incumbent would do so in the duopoly problem.)  Thus the
previous monopoly solution may be used.
We now turn to a comparison of the different equilibria for fixed parameter
values.  First, for r d ra
max
 ( rbmax ) consider the continuum of productively efficient
equilibria in which the two firms share the custom market.  Each of these equilibria is
specified by a value for yb , with 0  yb 1, ya  1 yb , and, for productive efficiency,
Ki  yi r  for i  a,b .  Since there are no income effects, total surplus, the sum of
consumers’ plus producers’ surplus, is a reasonable welfare measure.
Proposition 1: Assume r d r
a
max
.  Then among the productively efficient duopoly
equilibria in which the entrant has a positive share of the custom market, 0  yb 1,
total surplus is increasing in yb , the product range of the entrant.
Proof:  For the positive case, for each of these equilibria, for each type t , the fraction of
consumers who purchase something is 1 c , independent of whether the type is
produced by the incumbent or entrant.  Also the total investment plus product range cost
is 2 r  for each of these equilibria.  Thus in total surplus terms, the equilibria differ
only in the individuals who receive a custom rather than standard product.  In each t
market served by the incumbent, consumers with v0 t1/ 2  c / 2S  purchase the custom
good, while in those t markets served by the entrant, consumers with v0 t1/ 2 purchase
the custom good.  To maximize total surplus, every consumer with
v1  (1 S)v0 ! v0  c  should receive the custom rather than standard good, so every
consumer with v0 ! c / S  should receive a custom good.  Since c / S 1/ 2 , neither firm
sells custom goods to all the consumers who should receive them, but the entrant does
better than the incumbent.  Thus total surplus is increasing in yb .
The negative case is similar except that in every one of the productively efficient
duopoly equilibria, all consumers purchase something.  In the t  markets served by the
incumbent, consumers with v0 d1/ 2  c / 2T  receive the custom good, while in t
markets served by the entrant, consumers with v0 d1/ 2  receive the custom good.  To
maximize total surplus, every consumer with v1  T  v0 (T 1) ! v0  c , or
v0  (T  c) T , should receive the custom rather than standard good.  Since
(T  c) T !1/ 2, neither firm sells custom goods to all consumers who should receive
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them, but the entrant does better than the incumbent.  Thus total surplus is increasing in
yb .  Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 proves that if there are multiple duopoly equilibria, then among
those in which the entrant has positive product range, the best in terms of total surplus is
the productively efficient equilibrium in which yb  1.  It does not prove that the
equilibrium with yb  1 is better than that with yb  0 .  This is because of the
discontinuity in equilibrium pricing.  When yb  0 , the problem reverts to that of the
monopolist, where the standard product price is no longer constrained to equal c, the
unit production cost for the custom good.  Here we need to compare the monopoly
solution to the duopoly equilibrium with yb  1, which exists if r d rb
max
.
Proposition 2:  Assume r d rb
max
.  In the positive case, total surplus is larger in the
duopoly equilibrium with yb  1 than in the monopoly solution.  In the negative case,
total surplus is smaller in the duopoly equilibrium with yb  1 than in the monopoly
solution.
Proof:  For the positive case, note that rb
max ! r
m
max
, so for r d r
m
max
, the monopoly
solution has ym  1while for rm
max  r d rb
max
 the monopoly solution has ym  0 .  For
0  r d rm
max
, both monopoly and duopoly have product range 1, so what matters are the
fraction of consumers who get any product and the fraction that get the custom product.
In the monopoly solution, all consumers with v0  between 1 2 and 1 2 c 2S  receive the
standard product, and those with v0  between 1 2 c 2S  and 1 receive the custom
product.  In the duopoly equilibrium more of those who should receive the custom
product, do receive it (those with v0  between 1 2 and 1), and additional consumers
receive the standard product (those with v0  between c  and 1 2).  Thus total surplus is
larger with the duopoly.  Here the monopoly solution is worse than any of the
productively efficient duopoly equilibria.  In any t market served by the incumbent in
duopoly, the same set of consumers get the custom good as would in monopoly, and all
who would get the standard product with a monopoly, plus additional consumers
(c d v0 1 2), get it with the duopoly.
For rm
max  r d rb
max
, the monopoly solution includes no custom products.  All
consumers with v0  between 1 2 and 1 receive the standard product.  The duopoly
equilibrium adds surplus for all these individuals, since they now receive a custom
product whose value, (S 1)v0 , exceeds the standard product value v0  plus the extra
production cost, c .  Consumers with v0  between c  and 1 2 now receive the standard
product, with value v0 .  Because the duopoly has yb  1 while the monopoly has no
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custom products, there is one additional cost for which to account--the total investment
plus product range cost of 2 r .  The change in total surplus moving from monopoly to
duopoly is 3S 1 4c  4c2  8 2 r  which is strictly positive for every S ! 0 ,
c  S (2 4S) , and r  rbmax .
For the negative case, first note that rm
max ! rb
max
, so the comparison is always
between monopoly with full product range and duopoly with full product range.  Using
the results in Tables 1 and 2, monopoly minus duopoly total surplus is
(1 c)(2T 1 3c) 8T , which is strictly positive since c  T (1 2T) .           Q.E.D.
The result for the negative case may seem surprising, so it is worth examining
carefully.  Because of the negative correlation between v0  and v1 , every consumer has
either a relatively large v0  or a relatively large v1 .  Even with the monopoly solution,
prices are such that every consumer purchases either its custom good or the standard
product.  The same is true in the duopoly equilibrium, and every product type is
available in each equilibrium.  The prices charged affect the allocation of surplus
between consumers and firms, but in terms of total surplus, the only difference between
monopoly and duopoly is which consumers get custom goods.  In monopoly, all
consumers with v0  T  1 c  2T  get custom goods, while in duopoly, those with
v0 1 2  T 1 c  2T  do.  More consumers receive the custom good in the monopoly
solution than in the duopoly equilibrium.  Because the monopolist will sell to every
consumer, it can internalize the benefits and costs of changing the consumer who is on
the margin between buying the standard product and the custom product, by changing
both prices in such a way as to keep prices as high as possible while still selling to all
consumers and attaining the target marginal consumer.  In the duopoly equilibrium, the
standard product price is fixed at c, so that a change in the custom price has less of an
effect on the marginal consumer.  Lowering the custom price to serve more of the
consumers does not have as large a benefit as in the monopoly case (where the standard
product price adjusts to accommodate the change), so the duopolist serves too small a
fraction of the market with custom goods.
It is interesting to note that, for some parameter values, the monopolist sells
custom products to a higher fraction of consumers than would receive them in a total
surplus maximizing outcome.  As seen in the proof of Proposition 1, to maximize total
surplus, all consumers with v0  T  c  T  should receive the custom good.  For
T  1 3  2  and c between T 1 and its upper bound of T 1 2T ,
T 1 c  2T ! T  c  T , and more consumers get the custom good in the monopoly
solution than in the social optimum.  Because the monopolist charges only a single price
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for the standard good, and a single price for the custom good of each type, its incentives
do not match social incentives.  It may not want to lower its standard product price (and
correspondingly raise its custom price) when social incentives would call for it to do so.
4. Uncertainty and the choice of flexibility
A general conclusion of papers in the first strand of production flexibility
literature discussed in the introduction, is that with uncertainty in demand, for a single
firm problem, increased variability in demand leads to an increased desire for flexibility.
This result need not hold in our context.
Consider a monopolist in the random case, where for each type t, all consumers
of type t have the same valuation, (v0 *,v1*); assume V  v1 *v0 * c ! 0 .  The range of
consumer types is [0, ˜ m ], where ˜ m  is m1  m * d  with probability 1 2 and
m2  m *d  with probability 1 2, where 0  m* 1 and 0  d  min{m*,1m*}.
Given any K and y, the pricing stage is trivial: the monopolist always chooses price v0 *
for the standard product and price v1 * for the custom good.  (Recall by our tie-breaking
rule, since v1 *c ! v0 * , all consumers whose type is available will purchase the
custom product; consumers are indifferent while the monopolist earns higher profit with
that allocation.)
Given K, at the y choice stage, the realization mi  of the random parameter ˜ m 
has been observed, and, for 0 d y d mi , profit is (mi  y)vo * y(v1 * c)  y2 K  rK .
The optimal y is
y
m
(K ,mi )  
mi           if mi d KV 2
KV 2       if mi ! KV 2  
­
®
¯
If K t 2mi V , then the resulting profit is mi(v1 *c)  mi2 K  rK ; while if
K  2mi V , the resulting profit is mivo * KV
2 4 rK .
The K choice occurs before the realization of ˜ m  is observed.  The form of
expected profit depends on the value of K relative to 2m1 V  and 2m2 V , since those
values determine whether the y choice will be mi  or KV 2 .  Expected profit, 3 , as a
function of K is
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3(K)  
m * v0 
KV 2
4
 rK
                              if K d 2(m*d )
V
m *(v1 *v0 *c)
2

dV
2

KV2
8

(m *d)2
2K
 rK
  if 2(m *d)
V
 K d 2(m * d)
V
(v1 *c)m* m*
2 d2
K
 rK
                 if 2(m * d)
V
 K
­
®
°
°
¯
°
°
For some parameter values, an increase in the variability of demand (i.e., an
increase in d) leads to an increase in the optimal investment in flexibility, K, as in the
previous literature.  For example if r  V 2 (m *2 d2 ) 4(m*d)2  , then the optimal K,
is m *2 d2  r , which is increasing in d.  Given this optimal K, for each realization
of ˜ m , the optimal y is equal to ˜ m , so the expected product range is constant at m*.
However, the optimal investment in flexibility may be decreasing in the level of
variability of demand, as shown by the following result.
Proposition 3:  If V 2(m*2 d2 ) 4(m *d)2  r  V 2 4 , then both the optimal
investment in flexibility and the resulting expected product range are decreasing in the
amount of variability of demand.
Proof:  For these parameter values the optimal K is 2(m*d) 8r  V 2 ; y  m * d
when ˜ m  m1 , but y  KV 2  (m *d)V 8r  V2  when ˜ m  m2 .  The optimal K and
each of the product ranges are decreasing in d.  Q.E.D.
5. Conclusion
Our analysis of the desire for production flexibility that is driven by profit
opportunities in product customization has derived some unexpected conclusions.  As
shown in Section 4, when flexibility is motivated by production customization, even in
the single firm case, where there are no strategic effects, increased demand variability
may lead to reduced investment in flexibility.  This is in sharp contrast to other papers
examining the desire for flexibility based on other motivations.
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The results in Section 3 show the significant differences that arise when
valuations have negative rather than positive correlations.  With positive correlations,
the duopoly equilibrium has higher total surplus than the monopoly outcome, and the
entrant would produce the full range of custom product types even when the monopolist
would not.  With negative correlations, the monopoly outcome has higher total surplus
than the duopoly equilibrium and the monopolist would produce the full range of
custom product types even when the entrant in duopoly would not.  This suggests that
the extent to which the market for customized products will be served depends upon not
only the number of firms with access to the market, but also the nature of the
distribution in valuations (v0 ,v1) .
Our model is quite simple, but some of the conclusions seem robust.  For
example, the nonoverlap of product ranges in duopoly equilibrium should be true in
general with price setting.  A more realistic model would include multiple “dimensions”
in which customization might occur, where “dimensions” are determined by the
technology of flexibility.  Perhaps the set of machines used or the organization of
production must change to produce products in different “dimensions.” To avoid
overlap, and the resulting fierce price competition that would result, firms might
specialize in the “dimensions” of customization they offer.  As long as the firms each
retain some exclusive types of customization, they will be able to create added value for
consumers, and retain some market power.
The importance of customization will depend on both the distributions of
valuations, as well as the degree to which the costs of customization can be lowered to
approximate those of standard goods.  If we remove the assumption of equal density of
consumers across types, then the product range question takes on additional realism and
complexity.  For which custom types is the potential market largest, and can those
different types be produced together at reasonable cost?  Firms face a complex and
interesting challenge in identifying the best mix of custom product types, both in terms
of demand and cost.
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